Institution: University of Manchester
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 2.01 | 3.69 | 0.00 | 7.71 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | Political motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2014 | Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2014 | Power sharing and electoral equilibrium | Economic Theory | B | 1 |
| 2008 | Separation of powers and political budget cycles | Public Choice | B | 2 |