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Murat R. Sertel

Institution: Unknown

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://mscenter.bilgi.edu.tr/en/page/murat-sertel/

First Publication: 1972

Most Recent: 2007

RePEc ID: pse174 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total Percentile
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
All Time 8.07 12.11 6.73 5.55 32.46 96%

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 22
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 25.90

Publications (22)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2007 The Manipulability of Matching Rules via Segmentation Economic Theory B 2
2007 Ranking committees, income streams or multisets Economic Theory B 2
2007 Ranking Committees, Income Streams or Multisets Economic Theory B 2
2007 Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives Social Choice and Welfare C 2
2005 Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? An exploratory panel study Social Choice and Welfare C 2
2004 Core is manipulable via segmentation Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2004 Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners Social Choice and Welfare C 2
1999 The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable Social Choice and Welfare C 2
1998 Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's M-form firm Economic Theory B 2
1996 Prakash and Sertel's theory of non-cooperative equilibria in social systems -- twenty years later Journal of Mathematical Economics C 2
1996 Existence of non-cooperative equilibria in social systems Journal of Mathematical Economics C 2
1994 Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments Economics Letters C 1
1994 Auctioning the Provision of an Indivisible Public Good Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1993 Two forms of workers' enterprises facing imperfect labor markets Economics Letters C 2
1992 Pseudo-experimental estimates of labor supply functions in two Turkish state enterprises Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 3
1992 The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic Economics Letters C 1
1988 Characterizing approval voting Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1980 On the routewise application of choice Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1980 Routes and paths of comparison and choice Public Choice B 2
1979 Profit-maximizing design of enterprises through incentives Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1979 Class conflict and fairness in “democratic capitalism” Public Choice B 2
1972 A Four-Flagged Lemma Review of Economic Studies S 1