Institution: Kyoto University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.67 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.34 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 5.36 | 2.68 | 0.00 | 14.41 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2013 | Finitely repeated games with monitoring options | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2008 | The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2006 | Reputation and turnover | RAND Journal of Economics | A | 2 |
| 2002 | The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2002 | Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2001 | A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoring | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 1997 | Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |