Institution: Unknown
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.69 | 1.35 | 4.04 | 79% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2002 | Loss Aversion and Bargaining | Theory and Decision | C | 1 |
| 2001 | Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2001 | Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods | Journal of Public Economic Theory | C | 3 |
| 1994 | Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Known-Own Payoffs | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |