Institution: Chapman University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.34 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 1.59 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.69 | 0.00 | 5.28 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | INVESTMENT CHOICE ARCHITECTURE IN TRUST GAMES: WHEN “ALL‐IN” IS NOT ENOUGH | Economic Inquiry | C | 3 |
| 2018 | TRUST, RECIPROCITY, AND RULES | Economic Inquiry | C | 4 |
| 2017 | Deception and reception: The behavior of information providers and users | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 2 |
| 2015 | Commitment problems in conflict resolution | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 4 |
| 2014 | When parity promotes peace: Resolving conflict between asymmetric agents | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 3 |
| 2014 | Ageism, honesty, and trust | Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics | B | 2 |
| 2013 | Transparency, efficiency and the distribution of economic welfare in pass-through investment trust games | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 4 |
| 2013 | Do liars believe? Beliefs and other-regarding preferences in sender–receiver games | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 2 |