Institution: Chapman University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.34 | 0.34 | 6% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.01 | 0.59 | 1.60 | 37% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.71 | 0.59 | 5.30 | 82% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Investment Choice Architecture in Trust Games: When “all‐in” Is Not Enough | Economic Inquiry | C | 3 |
| 2018 | Trust, Reciprocity, and Rules | Economic Inquiry | C | 4 |
| 2017 | Deception and reception: The behavior of information providers and users | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 2 |
| 2015 | Commitment problems in conflict resolution | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 4 |
| 2014 | When parity promotes peace: Resolving conflict between asymmetric agents | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 3 |
| 2014 | Ageism, honesty, and trust | Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics | B | 2 |
| 2013 | Transparency, efficiency and the distribution of economic welfare in pass-through investment trust games | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 4 |
| 2013 | Do liars believe? Beliefs and other-regarding preferences in sender–receiver games | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 2 |