Institution: Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.50 | 1.84 | 0.00 | 2.85 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | A theory of rational marriage and divorce | European Economic Review | B | 3 |
| 2002 | Chores | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 1997 | Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality | Journal of Public Economics | A | 4 |
| 1995 | Education and the poverty trap | European Economic Review | B | 4 |