Institution: Government of Minnesota
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 0.00 | 4.04 | 0.00 | 1.85 | 5.89 | 83% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 2 |
| 2004 | Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 3 |
| 2004 | Observable implications of equilibrium behavior on finite data | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 1 |
| 1999 | Testable restrictions of Pareto optimal public good provision | Journal of Public Economics | A | 1 |