Institution: University of Illinois at Chicago
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 0.00 | 8.07 | 5.05 | 4.04 | 17.15 | 93% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | The number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random multi-team games | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 2004 | Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 2004 | Individually rational pure strategies in large games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 1999 | On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 1991 | Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 1989 | Symmetric paths and evolution to equilibrium in the discounted prisoners' dilemma | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 1986 | Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 1986 | On continuous reaction function equilibria in duopoly supergames with mean payoffs | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 1985 | Conjectural variations strategies in accelerated cournot games | International Journal of Industrial Organization | B | 2 |