Institution: Deakin University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.67 | 0.50 | 1.18 | 37% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.04 | 0.50 | 4.54 | 69% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 5.05 | 1.01 | 6.05 | 84% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Designing practical and fair sequential team contests: The case of penalty shootouts | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2021 | The optimal entry fee-prize ratio in Tullock contests | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 2 |
| 2020 | A sandwich theorem for generic n × n two person games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2019 | On the Timing of Production Decisions in Monetary Economies | International Economic Review | B | 3 |
| 2019 | Majoritarian preference, utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2013 | Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: A simple Nash program | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2013 | Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |