Institution: University of Windsor
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 0.00 | 2.02 | 1.01 | 3.53 | 6.56 | 84% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol | Economic Theory | B | 2 |
| 2007 | Non-Manipulability vs. Individual Rationality in a permit sharing problem | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2006 | Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 2 |
| 1997 | Double Implementation by a Simple Game Form in the Commons Problem | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 1996 | An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 1 |
| 1996 | Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 1 |
| 1996 | A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems | Economics Letters | C | 2 |