Institution: Wuhan University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 1.01 | 0.67 | 0.25 | 1.93 | 49% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 3.36 | 2.35 | 0.25 | 5.97 | 76% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 3.36 | 3.36 | 0.76 | 7.48 | 85% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Effort discrimination and curvature of contest technology in conflict networks | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2023 | Conflicts in regular networks | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 4 |
| 2022 | Robust perfect equilibrium in large games | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 4 |
| 2020 | Perfect and proper equilibria in large games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2020 | The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2019 | Bipartite conflict networks with returns to scale technology | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 3 |
| 2017 | Equilibria and incentives in private information economies | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 4 |
| 2015 | Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games with infinite-dimensional action spaces | Economic Theory | B | 2 |
| 2014 | On the diffuseness of incomplete information game | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 2 |