Institution: Paris School of Economics
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: http://www.pse.ens.fr/tercieux/
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 4.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.04 | 66% |
| All Time | 5.65 | 11.44 | 3.70 | 0.00 | 20.79 | 94% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets | Journal of Political Economy | S | 2 |
| 2014 | Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2012 | Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations | Quarterly Journal of Economics | S | 5 |
| 2012 | On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2012 | Log-linear dynamics and local potential | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2011 | Rationalizable implementation | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2010 | Robust equilibria under non-common priors | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2009 | Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2006 | p-Best response set | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2006 | p-Best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |