Institution: Iowa State University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.53 | 0.34 | 3.87 | 74% |
| Last 10 Years | 4.04 | 2.02 | 6.56 | 0.34 | 12.95 | 93% |
| All Time | 4.04 | 2.02 | 6.56 | 0.84 | 13.45 | 89% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Gradual matching with affirmative action | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2023 | Assignment maximization | Journal of Public Economic Theory | C | 3 |
| 2023 | How to De-Reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India | Management Science | B | 2 |
| 2022 | Parallel markets in school choice | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 4 |
| 2021 | Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2020 | Dynamic reserves in matching markets | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2019 | Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2017 | Large-Scale Affirmative Action in School Choice: Admissions to IITs in India | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 2016 | Two school systems, one district: What to do when a unified admissions process is impossible | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2015 | On relationships between substitutes conditions | Economics Letters | C | 2 |