Institution: Dalhousie University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 2.01 | 1.68 | 0.00 | 5.70 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 2.01 | 8.38 | 0.00 | 12.90 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2019 | Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 3 |
| 2019 | Consensus in social networks: Revisited | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 2 |
| 2019 | Eliciting and Aggregating Information By Sortition in Collective Choice | Economic Journal | A | 2 |
| 2015 | Centralized allocation in multiple markets | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 2 |
| 2014 | The Day Care Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 3 |
| 2013 | Matching with quorums | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2013 | To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2013 | Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2013 | Quantity precommitment and price-matching | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 1 |