Institution: Helsingin Yliopisto
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 1.35 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.35 | 35% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 11.44 | 2.02 | 2.02 | 15.47 | 92% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2011 | Dynamic coalitional equilibrium | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2008 | Bargaining with many players: A limit result | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2008 | Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2007 | Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, discounting, and Nash bargaining | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2007 | Subgame perfect implementation: A full characterization | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2007 | Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2006 | Implementing a surplus division rule | Economics Letters | C | 1 |