Institution: Universitat de Girona
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.18 | 0.00 | 1.18 | 37% |
| Last 10 Years | 2.69 | 0.00 | 1.18 | 0.84 | 4.71 | 70% |
| All Time | 2.69 | 3.36 | 1.85 | 0.84 | 8.75 | 87% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Condorcet Consistency and Pairwise Justifiability Under Variable Agendas | International Economic Review | B | 4 |
| 2022 | Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2020 | Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2019 | Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness | Economics Letters | C | 3 |
| 2016 | Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies | American Economic Review | S | 3 |
| 2012 | Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient? | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2010 | Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2000 | Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |