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Karl Wärneryd

Global rank #1927 97%

Institution: Stockholm School of Economics

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

First Publication: 1990

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: pwa264 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.01
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.01
All Time 0.00 4.02 19.77 0.00 35.86

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 22
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 40.05

Publications (22)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 Group conflict, group composition, and policy convergence Economics Letters C 1
2018 CHAOTIC DYNAMICS IN CONTESTS Economic Inquiry C 1
2013 Common-value contests with asymmetric information Economics Letters C 1
2012 The evolution of preferences for conflict Economics Letters C 1
2012 Nine points of the law: evidentiary rules and the costs of litigation Public Choice B 1
2012 Multi-player contests with asymmetric information Economic Theory B 1
2008 Long-run selection and the work ethic Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2007 Distributional conflict in organizations European Economic Review B 3
2007 Sexual reproduction and time-inconsistent preferences Economics Letters C 1
2006 Conflict and the Social Contract* Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 2
2006 Population uncertainty in contests Economic Theory B 2
2003 Information in conflicts Journal of Economic Theory A 1
2002 Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2001 Replicating contests Economics Letters C 1
2000 In Defense of Lawyers: Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation Games and Economic Behavior B 1
1998 Distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization Journal of Public Economics A 1
1994 Transaction cost, institutions, and evolution Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 1
1994 Partisanship as Information. Public Choice B 1
1993 Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability Games and Economic Behavior B 1
1992 Communication, correlation, and symmetry in bargaining Economics Letters C 1
1991 Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk Economics Letters C 1
1990 Legal restrictions and monetary evolution Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 1