Institution: Leopold-Franzens-Universität Innsbruck
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.80 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 1.07 | 4.69 | 0.00 | 7.67 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Where to look for the morals in markets? | Experimental Economics | A | 5 |
| 2015 | Beliefs and truth-telling: A laboratory experiment | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 3 |
| 2014 | Subjective Performance Evaluations and Reciprocity in Principal–Agent Relations | Scandanavian Journal of Economics | B | 2 |
| 2013 | Truth, Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender–Receiver Games | Scandanavian Journal of Economics | B | 3 |
| 2011 | A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 3 |
| 2010 | Stochastic stability for roommate markets | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2010 | Farsighted house allocation | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 3 |
| 2009 | Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 2 |
| 2008 | Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game | Economics Letters | C | 3 |
| 2004 | Delegated expertise--when are good projects bad news? | Economics Letters | C | 2 |