Roberto A. Weber

Global rank #1666 98%

Institution: Universität Zürich

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/faculty/weber.html

First Publication: 1999

Most Recent: 2017

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period	S (4x)	A (2x)	B (1x)	Total
Last 5 Years	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Last 10 Years	0.00	0.67	1.34	2.68
All Time	4.02	7.04	12.07	42.23

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 26

Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 23.22

Publications (26)

Year	Article	Journal	Tier	Authors
2017	Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction	Experimental Economics	A	3
2016	Coordination with decentralized costly communication	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	B	3
2016	Turning a blind eye, but not the other cheek: On the robustness of costly punishment	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	B	3
2015	Do Markets Erode Social Responsibility?	Quarterly Journal of Economics	S	3
2015	An experimental study of persuasion bias and social influence in networks	European Economic Review	B	3
2015	On the persistence of strategic sophistication	Journal of Economic Theory	A	3
2014	Does willful ignorance deflect punishment? – An experimental study	European Economic Review	B	3
2013	Implicit vs. explicit deception in ultimatum games with incomplete information	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	B	3
2012	Sorting in Experiments with Application to Social Preferences	American Economic Journal: Applied Economics	A	3
2012	Whom do you distrust and how much does it cost? An experiment on the measurement of trust	Games and Economic Behavior	B	3
2011	Coordination in the Presence of Asset Markets	American Economic Review	S	3
2010	Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship	American Economic Review	S	3
2010	Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior	Games and Economic Behavior	B	2
2010	Meaningful learning and transfer of learning in games played repeatedly without feedback	Games and Economic Behavior	B	2
2007	Solving coordination failure with “all-or-none” group-level incentives	Experimental Economics	A	3
2007	How effective is advice from interested parties?: An experimental test using a pure coordination game	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	B	3
2007	Letting the good times roll: A theory of voter inference and experimental evidence	Public Choice	B	2
2007	Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness	Economic Theory	B	3
2006	“Behavioral experiments” in economics	Experimental Economics	A	2
2006	Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others	Experimental Economics	A	3
2006	Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups	American Economic Review	S	1
2004	Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games	Experimental Economics	A	3
2003	'Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game	Games and Economic Behavior	B	1
2001	Behavior and Learning in the “Dirty Faces” Game	Experimental Economics	A	1
2000	The effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 x 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	B	3
1999	The econometrics and behavioral economics of escalation of commitment: a re-examination of Staw and Hoang's NBA data	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	B	2