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Shlomo Weber

Global rank #2326 97%

Institution: New Economic School (NES)

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

First Publication: 1981

Most Recent: 2016

RePEc ID: pwe37 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 1.84
All Time 0.00 11.56 11.39 0.00 37.87

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 34
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 29.79

Publications (34)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2016 A simple characterization of the family of diversity indices Economics Letters C 2
2016 Gale–Nikaido–Debreu and Milgrom–Shannon: Communal interactions with endogenous community structures Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2011 Games of social interactions with local and global externalities Economics Letters C 2
2008 "Almost" subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting Journal of Economic Theory A 4
2008 Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization Journal of Public Economics A 3
2005 Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability Journal of Public Economics A 3
2004 Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2002 District formation and local social capital: a (tacit) co-opetition approach Journal of Urban Economics A 2
1999 Endogenous trade policy under foreign direct investment Journal of International Economics A 3
1999 On Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Common Agency Games Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1998 Market Structure and Foreign Direct Investment. Review of International Economics B 3
1998 Equilibrium in a Finite Local Public Goods Economy Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1997 Equilibria in a Model with Partial Rivalry Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1997 On existence of undominated pure strategy Nash equilibria in anonymous nonatomic games Economics Letters C 2
1997 The graph of Lindahl correspondence as the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern abstract stable set Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
1996 Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers (*) Economic Theory B 3
1995 Core equivalence with congested public goods Economic Theory B 3
1995 Core Equivalence with Congested Public Goods. Economic Theory B 3
1993 Stable Coalition Structures with a Unidimensional Set of Alternatives Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1992 A note on the free rider problem in oligopoly Economics Letters C 2
1992 Vertical product differentiation with entry International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
1991 The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1990 Leadership and Expenditures in Rent-Seeking Models. Public Choice B 2
1990 Equilibria in a market with state-contingent rental contracts Regional Science and Urban Economics B 2
1989 Contemporaneous externalities, rational expectations, and equilibrium production functions in natural resource models Journal of Environmental Economics and Management A 2
1989 'Top of the line' quality as an optimal solution for a multi-quality monopolist European Economic Review B 3
1989 Rent-seeking behaviour of retaliating agents Public Choice B 2
1987 Contract equilibria in a regulated rental housing market Journal of Urban Economics A 2
1985 Import controls under imperfect information Journal of International Economics A 3
1984 Monopoly regulation, quality choice and welfare : The open economy case Economics Letters C 2
1984 On approximate cores of non-convex economies Economics Letters C 3
1983 A core equivalence theorem with an arbitrary communication structure Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
1982 The equivalence of superadditivity and balancedness in the proportional tax game Economics Letters C 2
1981 Some results on the weak core of a non-side-payment game with infinitely many players Journal of Mathematical Economics B 1