Institution: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| All Time | 10.05 | 4.69 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 49.60 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | Merger Policy with Merger Choice | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 2013 | Does retailer power lead to exclusion? | RAND Journal of Economics | A | 2 |
| 2010 | Dynamic Merger Review | Journal of Political Economy | S | 2 |
| 2007 | Antitrust in Innovative Industries | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 2001 | Assessing the Property Rights and Transaction-Cost Theories of Firm Scope | American Economic Review | S | 1 |
| 2000 | Naked Exclusion: Comment | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 1998 | Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity. | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 1998 | Exclusive Dealing | Journal of Political Economy | S | 2 |
| 1990 | Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion. | American Economic Review | S | 1 |
| 1987 | Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 1987 | Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria II. Applications | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 1983 | Moral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance | Journal of Public Economics | A | 1 |