Institution: Indian Institute of Management Calcutta (IIMCAL)
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.67 | 0.67 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 4.52 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.67 | 0.67 | 1.84 | 0.00 | 5.87 |
| All Time | 0.67 | 2.68 | 3.18 | 0.00 | 11.23 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Electoral competition, electoral uncertainty and corruption: Theory and evidence from India | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 4 |
| 2022 | Full Information Equivalence in Large Elections | Econometrica | S | 3 |
| 2022 | Intellectual property regimes and wage inequality | Journal of Development Economics | A | 3 |
| 2018 | On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2017 | Voting with endogenous information acquisition: Experimental evidence | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2015 | Mobility and Conflict | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 3 |
| 2014 | Resistance, redistribution and investor-friendliness | Journal of Development Economics | A | 2 |
| 2014 | Compulsory versus voluntary voting: An experimental study | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2013 | Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence | RAND Journal of Economics | A | 2 |