Institution: RMIT University
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 14% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 2.69 | 1.51 | 0.00 | 4.20 | 67% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 4.71 | 2.19 | 1.01 | 7.90 | 86% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Defaults and cognitive effort | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 4 |
| 2017 | Asymmetric and endogenous within-group communication in competitive coordination games | Experimental Economics | A | 3 |
| 2017 | One man, one bid | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2016 | Same process, different outcomes: group performance in an acquiring a company experiment | Experimental Economics | A | 3 |
| 2014 | Communication & competition | Experimental Economics | A | 2 |
| 2014 | Three-Player Trust Game with Insider Communication | Economic Inquiry | C | 2 |
| 2012 | How Groups Reach Agreement in Risky Choices: an Experiment | Economic Inquiry | C | 2 |
| 2012 | Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |