Institution: University of Saskatchewan
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.02 | 0.00 | 2.02 | 47% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 14.13 | 1.01 | 15.14 | 92% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2007 | Welfare reductions from small cost reductions in differentiated oligopoly | International Journal of Industrial Organization | B | 2 |
| 2001 | A characterization for the negative welfare effects of cost reduction in Cournot oligopoly | International Journal of Industrial Organization | B | 1 |
| 2001 | The relative interior of the base polyhedron and the core | Economic Theory | B | 1 |
| 2000 | The labor market effects of non-wage compensations | Labour Economics | B | 2 |
| 2000 | The core in an oligopoly market with indivisibility | Economic Theory | B | 1 |
| 1999 | A [beta]-Core Existence Result and Its Application to Oligopoly Markets | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 1996 | The hybrid equilibria and core selection in exchange economies with externalities | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 1 |
| 1992 | The hybrid solutions of an N-person game | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |