Institution: Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management (CREM)
Primary Field: Urban/Geographic (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 5.05 | 4.04 | 9.08 | 87% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | On the existence of Nash equilibria in an asymmetric tax competition game | Regional Science and Urban Economics | B | 2 |
| 2008 | Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2008 | Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2006 | The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: A note | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2005 | Existence of equilibria in a basic tax-competition model | Regional Science and Urban Economics | B | 2 |
| 1999 | Pure strategy Nash equilibria of non-zero-sum two-person games: non-convex case | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 1998 | A new necessary condition for Nash implementation | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 1 |
| 1997 | On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 1997 | Pure-Strategy [epsiv]-Nash Equilibrium inn-Person Nonzero-Sum Discontinuous Games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |