On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions in bimatrix game forms

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2008
Volume: 139
Issue: 1
Pages: 392-395

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We provide an example of an outcome game form with two players for which there is an open set of utilities for both players such that, in each of the associated games, the set of Nash equilibria induces a continuum of outcome distributions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:139:y:2008:i:1:p:392-395
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25