Institution: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.67 | 0.00 | 0.67 | 19% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 5.38 | 3.36 | 1.35 | 10.09 | 88% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | Endogenous party platforms: ‘stochastic’ membership | Economic Theory | B | 3 |
| 2015 | Determinacy of equilibrium in outcome game forms | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 3 |
| 2012 | Determinacy of equilibrium outcome distributions for zero sum and common utility games | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2008 | On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions in bimatrix game forms | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2004 | A model of endogenous political party platforms | Economic Theory | B | 3 |
| 2000 | Welfarism in Economic Domains | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 1998 | Efficiency, monotonicity and rationality in public goods economies | Economic Theory | B | 2 |
| 1998 | Income taxation, uncertainty and stability | Journal of Public Economics | A | 2 |
| 1997 | Tax Enforcement Problems | Scandanavian Journal of Economics | B | 2 |
| 1995 | Popular support for progressive taxation | Economics Letters | C | 2 |