Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 1986
Volume: 53
Issue: 3
Pages: 447-456

Authors (2)

Jerry R. Green (not in RePEc) Jean-Jacques Laffont

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a principal-agent model with adverse selection, we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent's message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic. We characterize such correspondence for which the Revelation Principle is valid.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:53:y:1986:i:3:p:447-456.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25