Regulating quack medicine

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2020
Volume: 182
Issue: 3
Pages: 273-286

Authors (3)

Peter T. Leeson (George Mason University) M. Scott King (not in RePEc) Tate J. Fegley (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract Quack medicines were prepackaged, commercially marketed medicinal concoctions brewed from “secret recipes” that often contained powerful drugs. Governmental regulation of them in late nineteenth-century England is heralded as a landmark of public health policy. We argue that it’s instead a landmark of medicinal rent-seeking. We develop a theory of quack medicine regulation in Victorian England according to which health professionals faced growing competition from close substitutes: quack medicine vendors. To protect their rents, health professionals organized, lobbied, and won laws granting them a monopoly over the sale of “poisonous” medicaments, most notably, quack medicines.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:182:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00656-w
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25