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Peter T. Leeson

Global rank #1174 98%

Institution: George Mason University

Primary Field: Public (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://www.PeterLeeson.com

First Publication: 2004

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: ple206 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.67 5.70 0.00 7.54
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.67 8.38 0.00 10.22
All Time 2.01 0.67 45.75 0.00 57.98

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 38
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 54.36

Publications (38)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 Predatory private governance European Economic Review B 1
2023 Public choice and public health Public Choice B 2
2022 A normal market European Economic Review B 1
2022 Hobo Economicus Economic Journal A 3
2021 Kornai goes to Kenya Public Choice B 3
2021 Externality and COVID‐19 Southern Economic Journal C 2
2020 Regulating quack medicine Public Choice B 3
2018 Wealth-destroying private property rights World Development B 2
2017 Child brides Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2015 Institutionally Constrained Technology Adoption: Resolving the Longbow Puzzle Journal of Law and Economics B 2
2014 The costs of conflict Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 4
2013 The Amplification Effect: Foreign Aid's Impact on Political Institutions Kyklos C 3
2013 Gypsy law Public Choice B 1
2013 Vermin Trials Journal of Law and Economics B 1
2012 Comparing the spread of capitalism and democracy Economics Letters C 3
2012 Ordeals Journal of Law and Economics B 1
2011 Quasimarket failure Public Choice B 3
2011 Was privateering plunder efficient? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2011 Government, clubs, and constitutions Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 1
2010 Rational choice, Round Robin, and rebellion: An institutional solution to the problems of revolution Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 1
2010 Pirational choice: The economics of infamous pirate practices Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 1
2009 Media as a Mechanism of Institutional Change and Reinforcement Kyklos C 2
2009 The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract Public Choice B 1
2009 Scott Gehlbach: Representation Through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States Public Choice B 1
2008 Costly price discrimination Economics Letters C 2
2008 C.C. Gibson, K. Andersson, E. Ostrom and S. Shivakumar, The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid , Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005) ISBN 0-19-927884-9 264 + xxi pp., index, $35.00. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 1
2008 Coordination without command: Stretching the scope of spontaneous order Public Choice B 1
2008 Weathering Corruption Journal of Law and Economics B 2
2007 Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence Public Choice B 1
2007 Efficient anarchy Public Choice B 1
2007 Edward P. Stringham, ed., Anarchy and the Law: The Political Economy of Choice Public Choice B 1
2007 Trading with Bandits Journal of Law and Economics B 1
2007 An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization Journal of Political Economy S 1
2007 The Political, Economic, and Social Aspects of Katrina Southern Economic Journal C 6
2006 Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis Public Choice B 2
2005 Gary H. Stern and Ron J. Feldman, Too Big To Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC (2004) 230 + xiii pp., index, US$ 32.95, ISBN 0-8157-8152-0. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 1
2005 Self-enforcing arrangements in African political economy Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 1
2004 Read All About It! Understanding the Role of Media in Economic Development Kyklos C 2