Temptation in vote-selling: Evidence from a field experiment in the Philippines

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Development Economics
Year: 2018
Volume: 131
Issue: C
Pages: 1-14

Authors (4)

Hicken, Allen (not in RePEc) Leider, Stephen (University of Michigan) Ravanilla, Nico (not in RePEc) Yang, Dean (University of Michigan)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We report the results of a randomized field experiment in the Philippines on the effects of two common anti-vote-selling strategies involving eliciting promises from voters. An invitation to promise not to vote-sell is taken up by most respondents, reduces vote-selling, and has a larger effect in races with smaller vote-buying payments. The treatment reduces vote-selling in the smallest-stakes election by 10.9 percentage points. Inviting voters to promise to “vote your conscience” despite accepting money is significantly less effective. The results are consistent with a behavioral model in which voters are only partially sophisticated about their vote-selling temptation.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:deveco:v:131:y:2018:i:c:p:1-14
Journal Field
Development
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25