Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2011
Volume: 146
Issue: 5
Pages: 1770-1795

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We generalize the results of Hörner and Lovo (2009) [15] to N-player games with arbitrary information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under low discounting as the set of feasible payoffs that are individually rational, jointly rational, and incentive compatible. Second, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:1770-1795
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25