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Tristan Tomala

Global rank #3486 96%

Institution: HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales)

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://sites.google.com/site/tristantomala2

First Publication: 1999

Most Recent: 2022

RePEc ID: pto425 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.67
Last 10 Years 0.00 2.68 1.17 0.00 6.54
All Time 0.00 4.36 10.56 0.00 19.27

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 15
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 14.98

Publications (15)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2022 Social learning in nonatomic routing games Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2019 Persuasion with limited communication capacity Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2018 Zero-sum revision games Games and Economic Behavior B 4
2018 Belief-free price formation Journal of Financial Economics A 3
2017 Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2015 Approximate implementation in Markovian environments Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2014 Secure message transmission on directed networks Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2012 Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2011 Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2011 Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2009 Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2008 Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2004 Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2004 Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1999 Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Observable Payoff Vectors Games and Economic Behavior B 1