The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2014
Volume: 125
Issue: 3
Pages: 422-425

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We establish the effort-maximizing rule of allocating heterogeneous prizes when contestants privately observe their effort efficiencies. With ex ante symmetric players and increasing virtual effort efficiency, an all pay auction maximizes the total expected effort.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:3:p:422-425
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25