|
2025
|
Move orders in contests: Equilibria and winning chances
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
2025
|
An implementation of the general optimal mechanism in Esö and Szentes (2007)
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2025
|
Design tools for all-pay contests: Aligning incentives and balancing the playing field
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
4
|
|
2024
|
Coupling Information Disclosure with a Quality Standard in R&D Contests
|
Journal of Industrial Economics
|
A
|
4
|
|
2024
|
Performance bundling in multi-dimensional competitions
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2024
|
Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
4
|
|
2023
|
Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
3
|
|
2023
|
Willingness to fight on: Environmental quality in dynamic contests
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2023
|
Constrained contests with a continuum of battles
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
2023
|
Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2023
|
Information sharing decisions in all-pay auctions with correlated types
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
3
|
|
2022
|
Sequential Screening with Type-Enhancing Investment
|
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
|
B
|
2
|
|
2022
|
Deposit Requirements in Auctions
|
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
|
B
|
4
|
|
2022
|
Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
4
|
|
2022
|
Optimal favoritism in contests with identity-contingent prizes
|
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2022
|
Efficient public good provision by lotteries with nonlinear pricing
|
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2021
|
Orchestrating Information Acquisition
|
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
|
B
|
3
|
|
2021
|
Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
2021
|
Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2020
|
Ex Ante Efficient Mechanism with Private Entry Costs
|
Economic Inquiry
|
C
|
3
|
|
2020
|
On Equilibrium Player Ordering in Dynamic Team Contests
|
Economic Inquiry
|
C
|
2
|
|
2020
|
Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007)
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
3
|
|
2020
|
Task arrangement in team competitions
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2019
|
Enhancing Effort Supply with Prize‐augmenting Entry Fees: Theory and Experiments
|
International Economic Review
|
B
|
4
|
|
2019
|
The optimal allocation of prizes in contests with costly entry
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2018
|
Pairing provision price and default remedy: optimal two‐stage procurement with private R&D efficiency
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2018
|
Optimal prize allocation in contests: The role of negative prizes
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
4
|
|
2018
|
Ranking Disclosure Policies in All‐pay Auctions
|
Economic Inquiry
|
C
|
3
|
|
2018
|
How to split the pie: Optimal rewards in dynamic multi-battle competitions
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2017
|
Auctions with selective entry
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
2017
|
Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2017
|
Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2017
|
Optimal prize-rationing strategy in all-pay contests with incomplete information
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2017
|
Optimal contest design under reverse-lottery technology
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
3
|
|
2016
|
The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: A Bayesian persuasion perspective
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2016
|
Disclosure policy in Tullock contests with asymmetric stochastic entry
|
Canadian Journal of Economics
|
C
|
3
|
|
2015
|
Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
2015
|
Auctions with selective entry and risk averse bidders: theory and evidence
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2015
|
Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
3
|
|
2015
|
Axiomatizing multi-prize nested lottery contests: A complete and strict ranking perspective
|
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2014
|
Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
3
|
|
2014
|
The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2014
|
“Reverse” nested lottery contests
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
3
|
|
2013
|
Competitive effect of cross-shareholdings in all-pay auctions with complete information
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2013
|
Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2012
|
Incentivizing R&D: Prize or subsidies?
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2012
|
The optimal multi-stage contest
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
2
|
|
2012
|
Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
1
|
|
2011
|
On disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry
|
Public Choice
|
B
|
3
|
|
2010
|
Contest Design and Optimal Endogenous Entry
|
Economic Inquiry
|
C
|
2
|
|
2010
|
Entry Coordination and Auction Design with Private Costs of Information Acquisition
|
Economic Inquiry
|
C
|
1
|
|
2009
|
Contest with pre-contest investment
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2009
|
The beauty of "bigness": On optimal design of multi-winner contests
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Auction design with opportunity cost
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
1
|
|
2006
|
Measuring the degree of assortative mating
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|