The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: A Bayesian persuasion perspective

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2016
Volume: 147
Issue: C
Pages: 103-107

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Following a Bayesian persuasion approach, we establish that full disclosure (resp. concealment) is the contest organizer’s effort-maximizing policy for disclosing the number of actual contestants if the characteristic function of the imperfectly discriminatory contest technology is strictly concave (resp. convex).

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:147:y:2016:i:c:p:103-107
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25