Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2024
Volume: 215
Issue: C

Authors (4)

Feng, Xin (not in RePEc) Jiao, Qian (not in RePEc) Kuang, Zhonghong (not in RePEc) Lu, Jingfeng (National University of Singapo...)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper studies the effort-maximizing design of a team contest with an arbitrary number (odd or even) of pairwise battles. In a setting with full heterogeneity across players and battles, the organizer determines the prize allocation rule (or the winning rule of an indivisible prize) contingent on battle outcomes. We propose a measure of team's strength, which plays a crucial role in prize design. The optimal design is a majority-score rule with a headstart score granted to the weaker team: All battles are assigned team-invariant scores, the weaker team is given an initial headstart score which is the difference in strengths between teams, and the team collecting higher total scores from its winning battles wins the entire prize. The optimal rule resembles the widely-adopted Elo rating system.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:215:y:2024:i:c:s0022053123001618
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25