Privatization neutrality theorem revisited

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2013
Volume: 118
Issue: 2
Pages: 324-326

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Fjell and Heywood (2004) show that privatization is not necessarily welfare neutral in mixed oligopolies under a production subsidy if firms move sequentially. We find that the neutrality holds for any time structure if instead an output floor is introduced.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:2:p:324-326
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25