Institution: 東京海洋大学
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.02 | 0.00 | 5.03 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 5.03 | 0.00 | 9.55 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | On the number of employed in the matching model | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 2 |
| 2017 | A one-sided many-to-many matching problem | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 1 |
| 2016 | Individual transferable quotas in Cournot competition | Economic Modeling | C | 1 |
| 2016 | A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 2015 | Volume and share quotas in Cournot competition | Economic Modeling | C | 1 |
| 2015 | Existence of free entry equilibrium in aggregative games with asymmetric agents | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 2014 | Priority matchings revisited | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2013 | Privatization neutrality theorem revisited | Economics Letters | C | 2 |