Institution: 東京海洋大学
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.53 | 3.53 | 61% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.02 | 6.05 | 8.07 | 86% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | On the number of employed in the matching model | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 2 |
| 2017 | A one-sided many-to-many matching problem | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 1 |
| 2016 | Individual transferable quotas in Cournot competition | Economic Modeling | C | 1 |
| 2016 | A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 2015 | Volume and share quotas in Cournot competition | Economic Modeling | C | 1 |
| 2015 | Existence of free entry equilibrium in aggregative games with asymmetric agents | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 2014 | Priority matchings revisited | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2013 | Privatization neutrality theorem revisited | Economics Letters | C | 2 |