Information disclosure and the equivalence of prospective payment and cost reimbursement

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2015
Volume: 117
Issue: C
Pages: 439-452

Authors (2)

Ma, Ching-to Albert (Boston University) Mak, Henry Y. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A health care provider chooses unobservable service-quality and cost-reduction efforts. The efforts produce quality and cost efficiency. An insurer observes quality and cost, and chooses how to disclose this information to consumers. The insurer also decides how to pay the provider. In prospective payment, the insurer fully discloses quality, and sets a prospective payment price. In cost reimbursement, the insurer discloses a value index, a weighted average of quality and cost efficiency, and pays a margin above cost. The first-best quality and cost efforts can be implemented by prospective payment and by cost reimbursement. Cost reimbursement with value index eliminates dumping and cream skimming. Prospective payment with quality index eliminates cream skimming.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:117:y:2015:i:c:p:439-452
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25