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Ching-to Albert Ma

Global rank #720 99%

Institution: Boston University

Primary Field: Industrial Organization (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://people.bu.edu/ma

First Publication: 1988

Most Recent: 2024

RePEc ID: pma447 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 2.68 0.00 2.68
Last 10 Years 0.00 1.01 6.03 0.00 8.04
All Time 7.04 4.69 30.67 0.00 69.21

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 39
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 44.60

Publications (39)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2024 Equilibrium information in credence goods Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2023 Changing preferences: An experiment and estimation of market-incentive effects on altruism Journal of Health Economics B 3
2022 Technology adoption by primary care physicians Health Economics B 2
2019 Uterus at a price: Disability insurance and hysterectomy Journal of Health Economics B 3
2018 Product differentiation with multiple qualities International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2018 Incentives for motivated experts in a partnership Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 3
2017 Quality and competition between public and private firms Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2016 Information acquisition, referral, and organization RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2015 Competition, gatekeeping, and health care access Journal of Health Economics B 3
2015 Information disclosure and the equivalence of prospective payment and cost reimbursement Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2014 Public Report, Price, and Quality Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
2013 Health insurance, treatment plan, and delegation to altruistic physician Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2011 Health insurance, cost expectations, and adverse job turnover Health Economics B 2
2011 Optimal public rationing and price response Journal of Health Economics B 2
2010 Progress and compliance in alcohol abuse treatment Journal of Health Economics B 4
2007 Moonlighting: public service and private practice RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2005 Introduction Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
2004 Provider-client interactions and quantity of health care use Journal of Health Economics B 3
2004 Public rationing and private cost incentives Journal of Public Economics A 1
2004 Managed care and shadow price Health Economics B 1
2003 Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2003 Risk selection and matching in performance‐based contracting Health Economics B 3
2002 Network Incentives in Managed Health Care Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
2002 Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
1999 Introduction Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
1998 Health‐Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Reply Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 1
1997 Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment. American Economic Review S 2
1997 Introduction Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
1997 Option Contracts and Vertical Foreclosure Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 1
1994 Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 1
1994 repec:bla:jemstr:v:3:y:1994:i:1:p:93-112:a Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 1
1994 Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts Review of Economic Studies S 1
1993 Paying For Joint Costs in Health Care Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
1993 A signaling theory of unemployment European Economic Review B 2
1991 Adverse Selection in Dynamic Moral Hazard Quarterly Journal of Economics S 1
1989 Efficient allocation of a "prize"-King Solomon's dilemma Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1988 Implementation in dynamic job transfers Economics Letters C 1
1988 Stopping agents from "cheating" Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1988 Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents Review of Economic Studies S 1