The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2004
Volume: 94
Issue: 4
Pages: 1034-1054

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making public officials accountable (i. e., subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand, accountability allows the public to screen and discipline their officials; on the other, it may induce those officials to pander to public opinion and put too little weight on minority welfare. We study when decision-making powers should be allocated to the public directly (direct democracy), to accountable officials (called "politicians"), or to nonaccountable officials (called "judges").

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:4:p:1034-1054
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25