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Eric S. Maskin

Global rank #64 99%

Institution: Harvard University

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://scholar.harvard.edu/maskin

First Publication: 1978

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: pma498 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 2.01 0.00 1.01 0.00 9.05
Last 10 Years 2.01 2.01 1.01 0.00 13.07
All Time 35.86 11.06 22.79 0.00 189.69

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 64
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 72.70

Publications (64)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 Borda’s Rule and Arrow’s Independence Condition Journal of Political Economy S 1
2023 Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2020 Strategy-Proofness, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Majority Rule American Economic Review: Insights A 2
2019 Pandering and pork-barrel politics Journal of Public Economics A 2
2015 Why Haven't Global Markets Reduced Inequality in Emerging Economies? World Bank Economic Review B 1
2011 Commentary: Nash equilibrium and mechanism design Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2010 A celebration of Robert Aumann's achievements on the occasion of his 80th birthday Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2009 Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2008 Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals American Economic Review S 1
2008 Public-private partnerships and government spending limits International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2008 On the fundamental theorems of general equilibrium Economic Theory B 2
2005 Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting American Economic Review S 2
2004 The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government American Economic Review S 2
2003 Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2002 On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts European Economic Review B 1
2001 Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2000 Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers European Economic Review B 1
2000 Efficient Auctions Quarterly Journal of Economics S 2
2000 Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form Review of Economic Studies S 3
2000 Asymmetric Auctions Review of Economic Studies S 2
2000 Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions Review of Economic Studies S 2
1999 Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint American Economic Review S 1
1999 Bargaining, Production, and Monotonicity in Economic Environments Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1999 Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature Review of Economic Studies S 2
1999 Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality* Review of Economic Studies S 1
1999 Implementation and Renegotiation Review of Economic Studies S 2
1999 Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts Review of Economic Studies S 2
1999 Uncertainty and entry deterrence Economic Theory B 1
1996 A Walrasian Theory of Money and Barter Quarterly Journal of Economics S 2
1995 Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies Review of Economic Studies S 2
1994 The Invisible Hand and Externalities. American Economic Review S 1
1991 On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1990 Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information European Economic Review B 2
1990 Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games. American Economic Review S 2
1990 Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1990 Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players Review of Economic Studies S 3
1990 The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market. Journal of Political Economy S 2
1990 Disadvantageous Oil Tariffs and Dynamic Consistency. American Economic Review S 2
1989 Efficient renegotiation--proof equilibria in repeated games Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1989 Renegotiation in repeated games Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1989 Renegotiation-proof equilibrium: Reply Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1989 Rational expectations with imperfect competition : A Bertrand-Edgeworth Example Economics Letters C 2
1988 Corrigendum to 'A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, III, Cournot Competition' (vol. 31, no. 4) European Economic Review B 2
1987 Monopoly with asymmetric information about quality : Behavior and regulation European Economic Review B 2
1987 A theory of dynamic oligopoly, III : Cournot competition European Economic Review B 2
1987 Correlated equilibria and sunspots Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1986 The Existence of Equilibrium with Price-Setting Firms. American Economic Review S 1
1986 The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory Review of Economic Studies S 2
1986 The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications Review of Economic Studies S 2
1986 An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria Review of Economic Studies S 3
1985 Manifesto Quarterly Journal of Economics S 3
1985 Auction Theory with Private Values. American Economic Review S 2
1985 Input versus output incentive schemes Journal of Public Economics A 2
1984 On the efficiency of fixed price equilibrium Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1983 Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks. Journal of Political Economy S 3
1983 A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive Compatible Planning Procedures with Public Goods Review of Economic Studies S 2
1982 Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
1981 An equilibrium analysis of search and breach of contract II. A non-steady state example Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1980 On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control Review of Economic Studies S 3
1980 Optimal reservation price in the Vickery auction Economics Letters C 2
1979 The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility Review of Economic Studies S 3
1979 repec:bla:scandj:v:81:y:1979:i:2:p:227-37 Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 2
1979 A progress report on Kelly's majority conjectures Economics Letters C 3
1978 A Theorem on Utilitarianism Review of Economic Studies S 1