Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2011
Volume: 71
Issue: 1
Pages: 174-192

Authors (2)

Mailath, George J. (University of Pennsylvania) Olszewski, Wojciech (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust under almost-perfect almost-public monitoring. That is, the same specification of behavior continues to be an equilibrium when the monitoring is perturbed from perfect to highly-correlated private.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:1:p:174-192
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25