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George J. Mailath

Global rank #508 99%

Institution: University of Pennsylvania

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~gmailath/

First Publication: 1988

Most Recent: 2020

RePEc ID: pma6 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Last 10 Years 1.01 0.00 2.35 0.00 6.37
All Time 10.89 14.41 10.39 0.00 84.79

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 39
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 39.88

Publications (39)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2020 Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference American Economic Review S 2
2019 The curse of long horizons Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2017 WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME International Economic Review B 3
2016 BUYING LOCALLY International Economic Review B 3
2014 Stable Matching With Incomplete Information Econometrica S 4
2013 A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory<xref ref-type="fn" rid="FN18">-super-*</xref> Review of Economic Studies S 3
2013 Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2011 Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2008 Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Review of Economic Dynamics B 3
2008 Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection? Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2007 Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2005 Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2004 Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices American Economic Review S 3
2004 Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 3
2003 Market Selection and Asymmetric Information Review of Economic Studies S 2
2002 The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2002 Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2001 Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2001 Who Wants a Good Reputation? Review of Economic Studies S 2
2000 Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search American Economic Review S 3
1998 Class systems and the enforcement of social norms Journal of Public Economics A 3
1997 How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? Games and Economic Behavior B 3
1997 Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*) Economic Theory B 3
1995 Aristocratic Equilibria: Response. Journal of Political Economy S 3
1994 Financing Losers in Competitive Markets Journal of Financial Intermediation B 2
1994 Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1994 A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure Journal of Financial Intermediation B 2
1993 Perpetual randomness in evolutionary economics Economics Letters C 1
1993 Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1993 Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1992 Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth. Journal of Political Economy S 3
1992 Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1991 The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example Economics Letters C 1
1991 Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1990 Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents Review of Economic Studies S 2
1990 Workers Versus Firms: Bargaining Over a Firm's Value Review of Economic Studies S 2
1989 Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model Quarterly Journal of Economics S 1
1988 On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1988 An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling--Existence of separating equilibria Journal of Economic Theory A 1