Workers Versus Firms: Bargaining Over a Firm's Value

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 1990
Volume: 57
Issue: 3
Pages: 369-380

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We introduce a distinction between a firm and its network of workers. In a competitive world, if networks are easily lured away, the workers must receive the entire value of their contribution to the firm. How then can service firms have equity value? A model is analysed in which workers are paid less as a group than their value, even in a competitive world. The workers are assumed to have a nonwage benefit for working at the current firm; this benefit is privately known. These privately known benefits make it impossible for the workers to agree on a division of their value should they leave the existing firm for a new enterprise. The result is that the workers may receive a total compensation that is less than their contribution to the firm.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:57:y:1990:i:3:p:369-380.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25