Market Selection and Asymmetric Information

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2003
Volume: 70
Issue: 2
Pages: 343-368

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We consider a dynamic general equilibrium asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents and asymmetric information. We show how agents' different methods of gathering information affect their chances of survival in the market depending upon the nature of the information and the level of noise in the economy. Copyright 2003, Wiley-Blackwell.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:70:y:2003:i:2:p:343-368
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25