A strategic mediator who is biased in the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 117
Issue: 2
Pages: 490-492

Authors (2)

Mechtenberg, Lydia (Universität Hamburg) Münster, Johannes (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We model strategic mediation of the communication between an informed expert with a discrete type space and an uninformed decision maker. A strategic mediator can improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the expert.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:2:p:490-492
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26