Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic History
Year: 1989
Volume: 49
Issue: 4
Pages: 803-832

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The article studies the evolution of the constitutional arrangements in seventeenth-century England following the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It focuses on the relationship between institutions and the behavior of the government and interprets the institutional changes on the basis of the goals of the winners—secure property rights, protection of their wealth, and the elimination of confiscatory government. We argue that the new institutions allowed the government to commit credibly to upholding property rights. Their success was remarkable, as the evidence from capital markets shows.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jechis:v:49:y:1989:i:04:p:803-832_00
Journal Field
Economic History
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26