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Barry R. Weingast

Global rank #2078 97%

Institution: Stanford University

Primary Field: Public (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://www.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-bin/wordpress/

First Publication: 1981

Most Recent: 2016

RePEc ID: pwe334 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50
All Time 6.37 2.68 10.22 0.00 41.06

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 17
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 19.35

Publications (17)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2016 Authoritarian Survival and Poverty Traps: Land Reform in Mexico World Development B 4
2014 Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Political Aspects of Decentralization and Economic Development World Development B 1
2012 Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock Public Choice B 2
2009 Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives Journal of Urban Economics A 1
2005 Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style Journal of Public Economics A 3
1994 Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild. Journal of Political Economy S 3
1990 The Role of Credible Commitments in State Finance: Review Article. Public Choice B 1
1989 Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England Journal of Economic History B 2
1989 Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. Journal of Law and Economics B 3
1988 The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets. Journal of Political Economy S 2
1986 Congress and Regulatory Agency Choice: Reply [Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission]. Journal of Political Economy S 2
1984 The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC) Public Choice B 1
1983 Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission. Journal of Political Economy S 2
1982 Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications. American Economic Review S 2
1982 Congress as the American Economic Review S 2
1981 The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics. Journal of Political Economy S 3
1981 Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice Public Choice B 2